


The Missing Report: Why BC Preferred STV Over MMP 80% - 20% Through the Eyes of One BC Assembly Member – What an Extra Three Months Taught Me

What is the best strategy for electing 10 MPPs with more women, greater diversity and less false representation than our current FPTP system?

- **MMP:** Keep six discriminatory single-member districts and add one 4-member district.
- **STV:** Eliminate the single-member districts all together and have two 5-member districts instead.

If replacing Single-Member Districts with Multi-Member Districts and using higher District Magnitudes helps women, diversity, and reduces false representation, which system would be preferable, MMP or STV?

Electing 10 Members with MMP




Six Discriminatory Single-Member Districts

One 4-Member District

OR

Electing 10 Members with STV



Two 5-Member Districts

This Submission Describes:

- Why MMP is worse for women than STV.
- How STV improves Local Representation and reduces False Representation.
- How MMP makes Local Representation worse.
- How STV is simpler and more effective for the voter than MMP.
- “The Fun Things about STV”
 - a. How STV supports our democratic ideals and gives voters more of a say in how we’re governed.
 - b. How STV redefines what “democracy” means.

STV is the “Citizens’ Choice”.

MMP is the choice of politicians and political parties.

FPTP is the choice of those who like or need absolute power.

The Missing Report: Why BC Preferred STV Over MMP 80% - 20%

Through the Eyes of One BC Assembly Member – What an Extra Three Months Taught Me

Dear Ontario Assembly Members,

Hi, my name is Craig Henschel, and I was a member of the BC Citizens' Assembly on Electoral Reform. I grew up in Scarborough and have also lived in Kingston and Markham, Ontario.

The first time I read about STV, I thought it was all about a counting process. What all those transfers accomplished, I didn't know. MMP seemed to be simple, elegant and absolutely the way to go. No question.

I think Ken Carty (our Jonathan Rose) showed you a graph of how the BC Assembly preferred MMP early in our process and then moved to STV after our Public Consultation Phase and after a summer of hard work by Assembly members. The more we learned about STV, the more we liked it. The more we learned about MMP, the more we saw it as a flawed system.

I'm sure, at this time, that you may be wondering why the BC Assembly was so enthusiastic about STV. Why did BC prefer STV over MMP by 80% to 20%? What did they learn in those extra three months that they had in their process?

During the summer between our Learning Phase and our Deliberation Phase, we had five months to look at two of the most important issues to BC voters; Local Representation and Representation of Women. I hope this condensed version of our findings can help you in your deliberations.

One of the only failings of our Assembly was not writing an addendum to our Final Report to describe why we preferred STV to MMP.

This, unfortunately, wasn't in our job description, but I think it would have been a good idea. It might have helped STV get those extra 2.3% of votes to win the referendum. It would also have been respectful to all of those who were so sure that MMP is the perfect system.

It might also have been useful to future electoral reformers, like yourselves, to counter misinformation spread by people who didn't like our recommendation. (You might want to consider how you will defend your work once you have all gone home.)

In reality, STV did very well in BC. In the referendum, it got:

- **More than 50% support in 77 of 79 districts.**
- **57.7% overall, just 2.3% short of the double 60% majority needed to pass.**

Because the intent of a majority of the province was so clear, a second referendum has been scheduled for 2009 which will have education funded this time!

If I might offer some basic advice:

- **Be bold.** This is the only chance in which citizens are likely to have a say in how their democracy is structured. Worry about what the voters need. Politicians and political parties will be able to take care of themselves.
- **Build an STV system.** Unlike MMM, STV is a real alternative to MMP, and actually satisfies all of Ontario's electoral values. For the Assembly's recommendation to be credible, whatever you choose, it's important that it's clear that you have done your "due diligence".
 - **STV provides:**
 - Ability of all voters to have a say in the political parties' candidate selection process.
 - Ability of voters to shape the policies and direction of political parties.
 - MPPs must compete against each other for voter's support not just during elections, but also throughout their terms of office.
 - Province wide proportionality.
 - Local proportionality.
 - The most effective local representation and least false representation.
 - The most voter choice = the most accountability.
 - More opportunity for women and diversity than either FPTP & MMP.
 - A system free of discrimination & segregation, unlike FPTP & MMP.
- **Separate any recommendation to increase the number of MPPs from your electoral reform recommendation.** Let Queen's Park take the hit for more MPPs, not electoral reform. Design your electoral systems to work with both current and increased MPP levels.

STV is clearly the "Citizens' Choice" in BC, but not the preference of politicians and political parties which will lose some power under STV. After all, who wants to lose power? Certainly not those who have it now.

Who wants to gain a little power over how they are governed? One would think the voter. STV redefines what "Democracy" means.

I hope that you will take a few minutes to look through this "Missing Report". Contact me if you like. Or read my other submission #1983, which is a transcript of a presentation I made to Vancouver's City Council during our referendum campaign. It includes an informative Q & A session with City Councillors.

I hope this helps. Good luck. Sincerely,

Craig Henschel

Burnaby, British Columbia

Excerpts from:

(Underlines are mine.)

Enhancing Women's Political Participation: Legislative Recruitment & Electoral Systems

By Richard Matland, University of Houston Texas, Chapter 3, Women in Parliament: Beyond the Numbers, A Revised Edition, International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, 2005. <http://www.idea.int/publications/wip2/index.cfm>

"When considering women's representation, a crucial factor is whether the electoral system has SMDs where only one legislator is elected in the district, or a multi-member district (MMD) system where several MPs are elected from each electoral district." Page 99

2.1. The Advantages of PR Systems

"The obvious question is why countries with PR electoral systems show such a strong increase in representation and plurality/majority systems show such a modest effect? There are a number of explanations. First, PR systems have consistently higher district magnitudes, which lead to higher party magnitudes. (District magnitude is the number of seats per district; party magnitude is the number of seats a party wins in a district.) Party and district magnitudes are important because they affect party strategy when choosing candidates. The party gatekeepers, who choose candidates, will have a different set of concerns and incentives depending upon the electoral system.

When district magnitude is one, as it is in almost all plurality/majority systems, the party can nominate one person per district. By definition, the party has no chance to balance the party ticket. In nominating decisions in single-member districts, female candidates must compete directly against all men; and often when nominating a woman a party must explicitly deny the aspirations of the most powerful male politician in the same district. When district magnitude increases, the chance that a party will win several seats in the district increases. When a party expects to win several seats, it will be much more conscious of trying to balance its ticket. Gatekeepers will divide winning slots on the party list among various internal party interests, including, possibly, women's interests.

There are several reasons for this balancing process. First, party gatekeepers see balance as a way of attracting voters. Rather than having to look for a single candidate who can appeal to a broad range of voters, party gatekeepers think in terms of different candidates appealing to specific sub-groups of voters. Candidates with ties to different groups and different sectors of society may help attract voters to their party. A woman candidate can be seen as a benefit to the party by attracting voters without requiring the most powerful intra-party interests represented by men to step aside, as would be required in a plurality/majority system. Conversely, failing to provide some balance, that is, nominating only men, could have the undesirable effect of driving voters away.

A second reason is that within the party balancing the ticket is often seen as a matter of equity. Different factions in the party will argue that it is only fair that one of their representatives should be among those candidates who have a genuine chance of winning. Especially when a women's branch of the party has been established and is active in doing a significant amount of the party's work, women can argue that equity requires that they get some of the slots in winnable positions. A third reason for balancing the slate is that dividing safe seats among the various factions within the party is a way of maintaining party peace and assuring the continued support of the different factions.

Proportional representation systems can also help women because a process of 'contagion' is more likely to occur in these systems than in plurality/majority systems." P. 101

"2.2. Why Some PR Systems are Better than Others

While proportional representation systems are more advantageous for women, not all PR systems are to be equally preferred. There are two particular aspects that can help or hinder women's representation within the broader umbrella of PR systems.

Higher district magnitude: parties have the chance to compete for and win several seats, allowing them to go further down the party lists, where women are usually listed.

High electoral thresholds: these discourage the creation of 'mini-parties' which often elect only one or two representatives, usually male." Page 103

"2.3. Type of Electoral List

Another distinction between different PR systems is that some systems have closed party lists, where the party determines the rank-ordering of candidates, and some have open party lists, where the voters are able to influence which of the party's candidates are elected by means of personal voting. The crucial question is whether it is easier to convince voters to actively vote for women candidates, or to convince party gatekeepers that including more women on the party lists in prominent positions is both fair and, more importantly, strategically wise. I suspect that the answer varies from country to country." Page 104

"Under preferential voting systems such as the Single Transferable Vote (STV) or open list PR voting systems, being a woman may be an advantage or a disadvantage. To the degree that women organize and actively encourage the striking out of male names and voting for female names, this procedure can produce a surprisingly strong showing by women." Page 98

For the initial version of this Handbook, published eight years ago, on the basis of the limited empirical work that had been done up to that point, I cautiously suggested that closed lists were preferable. Since then further research has analysed the effect of the open-list system in several countries. The most recent research indicates that it is not possible to make a general recommendation: the effects of open-list systems on women's representation in fact vary dramatically, depending on the party's supportiveness of women's candidacies. Page 105


Furthermore, Gregory Schmidt found in Peru that open-list voting did not disadvantage women. Women activists in Peru ran a campaign urging voters to give their preferential votes to 'one of each' (i.e. pick one man and one woman) and this led to female candidates in open-list voting doing as well as men. Based on a review of this (admittedly limited) research, it would appear that no strong or unambiguous recommendation can be made one way or the other in terms of whether preferential voting helps or hurts women. Page 105

Figure 3: Why PR Systems are Better for Women

Page 105

HIGHER DISTRICT MAGNITUDES	CONTAGION
Has higher number of seats per district (<i>higher district magnitude</i>)	Party lists present greater opportunities to nominate women
Party can expect to win several seats in each district (<i>higher party magnitude</i>)	Greater capacity to promote women when challenged by another party (contagion)
Party more likely to balance ticket by including women (<i>balancing</i>)	Party does not have to pay the cost of denying a slot to an incumbent or male candidate in order to nominate a woman

Breakdown of Women's Representation by System



* The current percentage of women in SMP districts (21%) may increase to 25% if successful female regional candidates can make the leap to constituency seats. The adjustment might take place in 8 to 12 years (2 or 3 elections with MMP). 25% is used in calculations to give MMP the benefit of the doubt.

Why MMP is Worse for Women than STV (& Other Under Represented Groups)

It's a mixed system, incorporating most of the undesirable characteristics of FPTP. MMP is composed of 50% to 70% Single-Member Districts (SMDs) which systemically discriminate against women & limit diversity.

Mixed Member Proportional Systems

The Multi-Member District part of MMP does a good job of providing province wide proportionality by using a compensatory method of seat allocation. It looks at the percentage of votes a party gets, and how many constituency seats it won, and then compensates the party for the missing seats, so that the overall result is proportional.

Unfortunately, for women, MMP is not compensatory. It doesn't look at how many women should be elected (52%) and then add women to the Legislature to get 52%. Instead, MMP accepts the discriminatory results of the Single-Member Districts (Constituency Seats) and simply adds the women elected regionally in Multi-Member Districts (Regions).

With MMP, the improved results for women, from the Regional Seats, are always watered down by the discriminatory results from the Constituency Seats.

For this reason, MMP is always discriminatory, and not a very good performer for women. Even with closed zippered lists, MMP is not a great performer. There is always the watering down effect of the SMDs. Also, if Ontario is like BC, closed lists are not an option. The SMDs establish an upper limit of women's representation that cannot be broken.

MMP Segregates Women Away from Government: Most government seats are Constituency Seats (86%). (See next page) MMP adds women mostly to the Regional Seats, mostly held by Opposition MPPs.


Single Transferable Vote Systems

STV only has Multi-Member Districts, and therefore is not corrupted by Single-Member District discrimination. All STV MPPs are equal.

STV will always out perform MMP, as long as the jurisdiction's culture is the same.

Options B, C, E & H predict 35% women in Multi-Member Districts. Option G shows that STV with 30% outperforms MMP with 35%. Options D, F & I are quota based, indicating maximum benefit possible.

DM Possible Ratios of Men & Women Candidates in Multi-Member Districts for Both MMP & STV



* Only option for FPTP & MMP Single-Member Districts

This diagram shows the increased possibilities for women with MMDs compared to the single-member districts of FPTP & MMP.

Mavis: "Wow, we certainly don't want that car. Look how slow it goes."
 Anthony: "It's a Porsche being driven by an eighty year old. It's not a slow car, it's being driven slowly. Which car would you prefer?"
 Mavis: "The other one's going much faster. I want that one."
 Anthony: "It's a 15 year old economy compact being driven by a teenage boy. It's a slow car being driven as fast as it can go."
 Mavis: "The Porsche is the slowest car on the road, and I'll prove it by getting all my friends to say so."

Electoral systems are a little like cars. How well cars perform depend on how fast they can mechanically go and also on how fast they're driven. How well an electoral system performs depends on the mechanics of the system and on how the culture of its jurisdiction takes advantage of its possibilities.

Those who campaign so strongly against STV quote a few selected statistics. It should be noted that the sample sizes are so small, that looking only at statistics doesn't make very much sense. However, complete statistics are listed on page 15.

The statistics show that both MMP and STV can perform reasonably well, but also quite poorly, depending on the culture of the jurisdiction where they are used.

In Ontario, the same culture would be operating on both MMP and STV. Therefore the mechanics of the systems is the critical factor.

The Mechanism of Multi-Member Districts is Similar for Both MMP & STV

Both MMP & STV use Multi-Member Districts (MMD) to reduce the discrimination caused by Single-Member Districts. STV replaces all SMDs and MMP replaces 30% to 50% of SMDs.

For the purpose of electing women, an MMP district and an STV district of the same district magnitude would operate in the same way. Without the SMD pressure for parties to select a white male candidate, parties can put forward as many women and as much diversity as they want or are pressured to put forward by the public. Parties which do not put forward balanced and diverse slates of candidates will lose votes. (See Matland on page 3)

These political party desires, competition, and public pressure operate equally on both MMP and STV MMDs. It's the same mechanism for both MMP and STV. Therefore, estimates of the performance of MMD in MMP & STV can be assumed to be the same (35% on page 4).

The performance of Multi-Member Districts (MMD) for both MMP & STV depends on how many MMD there are and also on the District Magnitude (DM) of the districts. More MMDs are better & higher DMs are better.

The next pages show why MMP has fewer MMDs & smaller DMs, than STV.

Location of Government MPPs Elected Under MMP (2003 Estimate) (From Sub. #1249)					
MMP Plan	# MPPs (Local / Reg.)	# of Regions	# Local Gov't MPPs (%)	# Regional Gov't MPPs (%)	Total MPPs
A	139 (87/52)	11	57 (87.7%)	8 (12.3%)	65
B	135 (82/53)	15	55 (85.9%)	9 (14.1)	64

Local Seat #1 (One MPP)	Local Seat #2 (One MPP)	Local Seat #3 (One MPP)	Local Seat #4 (One MPP)	Local Seat #5 (One MPP)	Local Seat #6 (One MPP)
Instructions: Mark "X" Beside One	Instructions: Mark "X" Beside One	Instructions: Mark "X" Beside One	Instructions: Mark "X" Beside One	Instructions: Mark "X" Beside One	Instructions: Mark "X" Beside One
<input type="checkbox"/> Owner, Oliver - Right Party	<input type="checkbox"/> Crook, Carl - Right Party	<input type="checkbox"/> Doctor, Doris - Right Party	<input type="checkbox"/> Lawyer, Larry - Right Party	<input type="checkbox"/> SUV, Sam - Right Party	<input type="checkbox"/> Green, Gary - Right Party
<input type="checkbox"/> Advocate, Andy - Alternate Party	<input type="checkbox"/> Teacher, Tom - Alternate Party	<input type="checkbox"/> Creep, Carol - Alternate Party	<input type="checkbox"/> Ecological, Evan - Alternate Party	<input type="checkbox"/> Nurse, Alison - Alternate Party	<input type="checkbox"/> Scientist, Steven - Alternate Party
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Health, Heather - Left Party	<input type="checkbox"/> Advocate, Anne - Left Party	<input type="checkbox"/> Artist, Albert - Left Party	<input type="checkbox"/> Smug, Samantha - Left Party	<input type="checkbox"/> Bossy, Barry - Left Party	<input type="checkbox"/> Caring, Carla - Left Party
<input type="checkbox"/> Lawyer, Len - Middle Party	<input type="checkbox"/> Banker, Ben - Middle Party	<input type="checkbox"/> Economy, Eddie - Middle Party	<input type="checkbox"/> Popular, Pam - Middle Party	<input type="checkbox"/> Silly, Sally - Middle Party	<input type="checkbox"/> Teacher, Trish - Middle Party
<input type="checkbox"/> Follower, Frank - Splinter Party	<input type="checkbox"/> Extremist, Earl - Splinter Party	<input type="checkbox"/> Worker, William - Splinter Party	<input type="checkbox"/> Fool, Felix - Splinter Party	<input type="checkbox"/> Celebrity, Cool - Splinter Party	<input type="checkbox"/> Mayor, Mark - Splinter Party
<input type="checkbox"/> Ecological, Ed - Theme Party	<input type="checkbox"/> Charitable, Chad - Theme Party	<input type="checkbox"/> Nut, Norma - Theme Party	<input type="checkbox"/> Lazy, Larry - Theme Party	<input type="checkbox"/> Educator, Ed - Theme Party	<input type="checkbox"/> Visionary, Vern - Theme Party
<input type="checkbox"/> Beautiful, Betty - Independent		<input type="checkbox"/> Mayor, Michael - Independent		<input type="checkbox"/> Shooter, Straight - Independent	<input type="checkbox"/> Rich, Richard - Independent

MMP Ballot – Party Vote (Four Regional MPPs)

Instructions: Mark "X" beside one candidate from your preferred party. [Party list can be open or closed with many different voting methods, this is a simple one]

Right Party	Alternate Party	Left Party	Middle Party	Splinter Party	Theme Party
<input type="checkbox"/> Lawyer, Larry	<input type="checkbox"/> Advocate, Andy	<input type="checkbox"/> Steward, Stew	<input type="checkbox"/> Popular, Pam	<input type="checkbox"/> Worker, William	<input type="checkbox"/> Mayor, Michael
<input type="checkbox"/> Doctor, Doris	<input type="checkbox"/> Scientist, Steven	<input type="checkbox"/> Fiscal, Frank	<input type="checkbox"/> Teacher, Trish	<input type="checkbox"/> Visionary, Vern	<input type="checkbox"/> Ecological, Ed
<input type="checkbox"/> Landlord, Lance	<input type="checkbox"/> Teacher, Tom	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Health, Heather	<input type="checkbox"/> Carpenter, Carol	<input type="checkbox"/> Extremist, Earl	<input type="checkbox"/> Charitable, Chad
<input type="checkbox"/> Professional, Pam	<input type="checkbox"/> Nurse, Alison	<input type="checkbox"/> Advocate, Anne	<input type="checkbox"/> Lawyer, Len	<input type="checkbox"/> Celebrity, Cool	<input type="checkbox"/> Nutty, Norma
<input type="checkbox"/> Crook, Carl	<input type="checkbox"/> Celebrity, Steven	<input type="checkbox"/> Artist, Albert	<input type="checkbox"/> Silly, Sally	<input type="checkbox"/> Follower, Frank	<input type="checkbox"/> Educator, Ed
<input type="checkbox"/> Glitz, Gloria	<input type="checkbox"/> Creep, Carol	<input type="checkbox"/> Philanderer, Phil	<input type="checkbox"/> Criminal, Carla	<input type="checkbox"/> Opportunist, Olive	<input type="checkbox"/> Lazy, Larry
<input type="checkbox"/> Owner, Oliver	<input type="checkbox"/> Charitable, Chad	<input type="checkbox"/> Smug, Samantha	<input type="checkbox"/> Business, Betty	<input type="checkbox"/> Fool, Felix	
<input type="checkbox"/> Professor, Peter	<input type="checkbox"/> Ecological, Evan	<input type="checkbox"/> Caring, Carla	<input type="checkbox"/> Economy, Eddie		
<input type="checkbox"/> SUV, Samantha	<input type="checkbox"/> Fisherman, Fred	<input type="checkbox"/> Bossy, Barry	<input type="checkbox"/> Doctor, David		
<input type="checkbox"/> Green, Gary		<input type="checkbox"/> Homemaker, Susie	<input type="checkbox"/> Banker, Benny		

STV Ballots, Voting & Vote Counting

Voters have the final say in political parties' candidate selection process. Very cool.

Voters help shape political parties by getting rid of stale or self-serving candidates and supporting candidates whose values they share and the party can't get rid of by itself.

Possibility of voting for different types of constituencies: Geographic, party, women (you could vote for all women or zipper your vote), health, education, ecological, honourable people, business, cultural group, youth, seniors, etc.

No safe seats for candidates: Possibility of not having to vote for someone you think is a crook, criminal, opportunist etc. while still being able to vote for your party of choice.

Flexible Voting: Can vote for one preference or as many as you like.

Case Study: Filling in an STV Ballot

This STV ballot shows a middle of the road voter who is an environmentalist primarily, with an interest in health care second. Lastly, she would like to help additional women to get elected.

She feels comfortable voting for the Theme Party and then the Alternate Party, which don't really have a chance of winning but are environmental, but she knows that when they are crossed off the list, her whole vote will be transferred to her fourth choice, that might actually win. Although not really a Right Party supporter, she wants to support environmentalists, in whatever party they're in. After voting for all the candidates she can identify as environmentalists, she selects health care advocates, and then women. She doesn't vote for candidates she feels are crooks, philanderers, opportunists, etc. In this way, she has given the counting system something to work with, as it tries to find her a representative she really wants.

Case Study: Counting the Ballot

The counting process looks at her ballot repeatedly during the counting process and assigns as much of her vote as is needed to elect her most preferred candidates in the order of her preferences. Her ballot is kept in play throughout the counting process and portions of her ballot may help to elect several different candidates. Her preferences are added to the preferences of all other voters to select the most preferred candidates in the district. Each voter has a single vote that may be fractionally transferred between preferences to ensure absolute fairness.

MMP Ballots, Voting & Vote Counting

Who do list candidates owe their allegiance to, the political parties, or the voters? There are lots of names on the Party Ballot, and most of them did not campaign in the local area. Small changes in Party Vote Instructions can dramatically affect the amount of voter influence on who gets elected.

Above the Line Voting: Beware of this option. It transforms an open list into a closed list.

Contamination of Regional Lists: Candidates from the Local Elections will probably want their names on the Party Lists so they can still get elected even if they lose in their own district. There are some reasonable democratic arguments to allow or even require this, but it causes a problem. The discriminatory candidate selection process of the Single-Member Districts is carried over onto the Party Lists. Some parties may choose to add women to balance their lists. Other parties won't bother, preferring instead, to maximize the chances for their Local Election candidates (mostly men). Without very long lists, providing gender balance and diversity is very difficult. And then there's the problem of campaigning. Where did these added candidates campaign?

Case Study: Filling in an MMP Local Seat #1 Ballot

As in the STV Case Study, our voter would like to vote for environmentalists first, health care candidates second and women third. She knows that a vote for Ed Ecology of the Theme Party would be a waste of a vote. There are no other environmentalists on her ballot. So, she votes for the Heather Health, her 7th choice on the STV ballot.

Case Study: Filling in an MMP Party Ballot

Once again, our voter doesn't think voting for the Theme Party will work, so she strategically votes for Heather Health of the Left Party, because she has heard of her and not the others.

Case Study: Counting the Ballots

Local Seat Ballot: Ballot is picked up, looked at, put in a pile and forgotten. Largest pile wins.

Party Ballot: Ballot is counted for Party and List Representative. Provincial proportionality errors created by single-member districts are corrected with the Party Vote. Actual candidate(s) that correct errors are selected from party list under various methods.

STV Ballot (Five MPPs are to be elected)					
Instructions: • Number the boxes in the order of your choice. • Write the number "1" in one of the boxes and then show as many other preferences as you wish.					
Right Party	Alternate Party	Left Party	Middle Party	Splinter Party	Theme Party
<input type="text" value="8"/> Doctor, Doris	<input type="text" value="6"/> Nurse, Alison	<input type="text"/> Fiscal, Frank	<input type="text"/> Teacher, Trish	<input type="text"/> Follower, Frank	<input type="text" value="1"/> Ecological, Ed
<input type="text"/> Crook, Carl	<input type="text" value="3"/> Ecological, Evan	<input type="text" value="7"/> Health, Heather	<input type="text"/> Lawyer, Len	<input type="text"/> Opportunist, Olive	<input type="text" value="2"/> Charitable, Chad
<input type="text"/> Professor, Peter		<input type="text" value="9"/> Advocate, Anne	<input type="text"/> Criminal, Carla		
<input type="text" value="4"/> Green, Gary		<input type="text"/> Philanderer, Phil	<input type="text" value="5"/> Doctor, David		
					Independents
					<input type="text"/> Mayor, Michael
					<input type="text"/> Nutty, Norma

Fairness and Equal Representation

While it's important to be fair to the candidates and to the political parties, fairness to the voter is just as important:

- Each voter should be able to have representation in the legislature. About 50% of voters don't vote for the winner and therefore don't get a representative in Queen's Park.
- Each MPP should represent about the same number of voters. There should be equality of representation.

Local Representation is critical to rural and northern voters and is also important in urban areas which are changing rapidly, some prospering, some declining. Any diminution to the already poor levels of Local Representation would not be acceptable.

Unequal Representation: In the 2003 Ontario election, MPPs from different parties represented very different numbers of voters. Some voters have 3x the say of other voters.

STV: Uses quotas and proportionality to ensure that each MPP represents the same number of voters both with votes in the Legislature and with ideas in caucus and committees.

MMP: Uses proportionality, which provides equal voting but not equal representation of ideas.

Inequality in 2003 Ontario Election			
Party	Votes	MPPs	Votes/MPP
CPC	2,187	-	-
PCRP	293	-	-
FCP	34,623	-	-
FP	8,376	-	-
GP	126,651	-	-
L	2,090,001	72	29,028
LN	1,991	-	-
ND	660,730	7	94,390
PC	1,559,181	24	64,966
Others	13,211	-	-

MPPs, with their one vote in the Legislature, represent different numbers of voters.

This results in unequal power for each voter in Queens Park.

This is also a good example of "Exaggerated Majorities", which are fundamentally unfair to voters.

There are also 187,332 voters whose parties aren't represented at all.

How One 3-Member District is Better than Three Single-Member Districts for Local Representation

Reduction of False Representation & Addition of Local Proportionality (From 2003 Election Data)

District	Votes by Party								Calculations					
	L	PC	ND	GP	FCP	Ind	C	LTN	Total Valid Votes	–	Winning Votes	=	False Rep. (Wasted Votes)	% False Rep.
Kenora – Rainy River	6,746 25.89%	3,343 12.83%	15,666 60.12%	305 1.17%	-	-	-	-	26,060	–	15,666	=	10,394	39.9%
Thunder Bay – Atikokan	17,735 58.25%	5,365 17.62%	6,582 21.62%	762 2.5%	-	-	-	-	30,444	–	17,735	=	12,709	41.7%
Thunder Bay – Superior North	21,938 72.45%	2,912 9.62%	4,548 15.02%	882 2.91%	-	-	-	-	30,280	–	21,938	=	8,342	27.5%
Party Vote Totals	46,419	11,620	26,796	1,949	-	-	-	-	86,784	–	55,339	=	31,445	36.2%
Party Vote Percentage	53.5%	13.4%	30.9%	2.2%	-	-	-	-						
SMD Seat Allocation¹ (FPTP & MMP)	2	0	1	-	-	-	-	-						
SMD Un-represented Voters	0	11,620	0	1,949									13,569	15.6%
STV Allocations – General	STV allocates seats proportionally & according to voters' preferences. See ²													
STV Seat Allocation² Full Quota³ (Remainder)	2 (3,026)	0 (11,620)	1 (5,099)	0 (1,949)	-	-	-	-	Assumes no 2 nd preferences					
STV Un-represented Voters	0	<11,620	0	<1,949	-	-	-	-					<13,569	<15.6%

¹ **SMD Seat Allocation:** Plurality seat allocation is shown. AV allocation produces similar results, but even worse province wide proportionality than SMP.

² **STV Seat Allocation:** Without preferential ballots, it's impossible to determine exactly which candidates the voters would prefer. More information is needed from the un-represented voters. Second preferences from the 5 smaller parties are looked at. Both the L & ND party might win enough of the second preferences to win the seat. Also keep in mind that STV elects candidates, not parties. STV also, lets voters determine which candidates from each party they would prefer.

³ **Quota Determination:** To not elect 4 MPPs in a 3 MPP district, divide the number of valid votes by 4 & add one vote. Quota = (86,784/4) + 1 vote = 21,696 + 1 vote = 21,697 votes

False Representation – Who stole my MPP?

We need to find a way to make Local Representation more effective. To do this, we needed to understand why it is currently so ineffective.

- MPPs are typically only elected by 40% to 60% of the electorate.
- In the 2003 election in Ontario, MPPs won with an average of 50.37% support. This meant that about 50% of voters didn't actually send someone to Queen's Park. The MPP might claim to represent everyone in their district, but that would not be true.
- MPPs are stolen from half of the voters by Single-Member District electoral systems.

MPPs represent the people who voted for them. They don't believe what their opponents believe in. They don't represent them. This is exactly what we expect them to do. It's not

really a bad thing, as long as they don't claim to represent everyone in their district, which they do, because that is the fundamental premise of SMDs and FPTP & MMP systems.

Unfortunately, these constituency MPPs are just providing "False Representation" to all those who didn't vote for them. You don't get very Effective Local Representation, if you didn't vote for the winner. It's not just that you don't get an MPP, you get an MPP who represents you incorrectly. 50% of voters don't get Local Representation, they get False Representation

The cure for Unequal & False Representation is multi-member districts with preferential voting and an STV counting process.

How One 4-Member District is Better than Four Single-Member Districts for Local Representation Reduction of False Representation & Addition of Local Proportionality (From 2003 Election Data)

District	Votes by Party								Calculations					
	L	PC	ND	GP	FR	FCP	C	LTN	Total Valid Votes	–	Winning Votes	=	False Rep. (Wasted Votes)	% False Rep.
Elgin – Middlesex – London	24,914 57.31%	13,149 30.25%	4,063 9.35%	673 1.55%	671 1.54%	-	-	-	43,470	–	24,914	=	18,556	42.7%
London North Centre	20,212 43.43%	13,460 28.92%	11,414 24.53%	780 1.68%	242 0.52%	432 0.93%	-	-	46,540	–	20,212	=	26,328	56.6%
London – Fanshawe	13,920 35.87%	11,777 30.35%	12,051 31.05%	568 1.46%	493 1.27%	-	-	-	38,809	–	13,920	=	24,889	64.1%
London West	25,581 51.46%	15,463 31.11%	7,403 14.89%	805 1.62%	460 0.93%	-	-	-	49,712	–	25,581	=	24,131	48.5%
Party Vote Totals	84,627	53,849	34931	2,826	1,866	432	-	-	178,531	–	84,627	=	93,904	52.6%
Party Vote Percentage	47.4%	30.2%	19.6%	1.6%	1.0%	0.2%	-							
SMD Seat Allocation¹ (FPTP & MMP)	4	-	-	-	-	-	-	-						
SMD Un-represented Voters	0	53,849	34931	2,826	1,866	432							93,904	52.6%
STV Allocations – General	STV allocates seats proportionally & according to voters' preferences. See ²													
STV Seat Allocation² Full Quota³ (Remainder)	2 (13,213)	1 (18,142)	1 (34,931)	- (2,826)	- (1,866)	- (432)	-	-						
STV Allocation (Estimated)	2	1	1	-	-	-	-	-	Assumes no 2 nd preferences for ND					
STV Un-represented Voters	0	0	0	<2,826	<1,866	<432							<5,124	<2.9%

¹ **SMD Seat Allocation:** Plurality seat allocation is shown. AV allocation produces similar results, but even worse province wide proportionality than SMP.

² **STV Seat Allocation:** Without preferential ballots, it's impossible to determine exactly which candidates the voters would prefer. More information is needed from the un-represented voters. Second preferences from the smaller parties are looked at. It looks like ND party might win enough of the second preferences to win the seat. Also keep in mind that STV elects candidates, not parties. STV also, lets voters determine which candidates from each party they would prefer.

³ **Quota Determination:** To not elect 5 MPPs in a 4 MPP district, divide the number of valid votes by 5 & add one vote. Quota = (178,531/5) + 1 vote = 35,706 + 1 vote = 35,707 votes

I remember at a Public Hearing in Burnaby, BC, a presenter said:

“Everyone can’t win an election. Someone wins and someone loses. That’s how it works.”

Old Style Democracy: The point of FPTP and MMP constituency elections is to find a single representative for all the voters in your geographic area, even if the MPP doesn’t represent the point of view of 40% to 60% of the voters.

STV Democracy: The point of STV is to make sure that as many voters as possible actually have a representative that they want. This is a completely different concept. All voters win, not just those who vote for the winner.

Democracy doesn’t have to be only for those who vote for the single winning candidate.

STV reduces “False Representation”

- On average in FPTP & MMP, about 50% of the voters in a local district do not vote for the winning candidate. This results in constituency representatives that falsely represent half their voters. It means that only half of the people in any single-member district are actually getting “Local Representation”.
- STV, by providing local proportionality and MPPs who are each elected by the same number of voters, results in much less false representation and a significant increase in the number of voters who are actually represented in the way they would choose.

The effectiveness of local representation increases everywhere with STV, including sparsely populated rural districts

- Multi-member districts make local proportionality possible. This ensures that several points of view will be represented from each district to Queen’s Park.
- Even in large rural districts, adding three districts together makes it possible to add a component of local proportionality and reduce false representation.

Independents have a real chance to get elected

- In Ireland almost 8% of their MPs are independents. Well known local people can get elected, especially with next preferences. Extremist candidates will have difficulty getting elected because of the need for next preferences, which they are unlikely to get.
- This provides a practical way for MPPs to dissent from their party’s policies and not commit political suicide at the same time. They will be able to leave their party and still get elected as an independent in the next election. They won’t have to go to another political party right away.

Multi-party caucus will take basket of ideas to Queen’s Park

- MPPs from different parties, but from the same district, might come together and take a united stand on issues that are important to the local area; for instance, the closing of a hospital.
- As a group, your MPPs will form a (formal or informal) “Local Caucus”, taking a basket of ideas from your district to Queen’s Park. Communities are built by all of its members. To be successful, all of these ideas need to be expressed and heard, so that the policy that helps build and protect the entire community is chosen, rather than the policy that only serves a plurality of the voters.
- This caucus will be able to forcefully represent local interests in both government and opposition.

No more disappearing MPPs

- During their term of office, it won’t be possible for your MPP to just take off to Queen’s Park and show up, back in your riding, in four years for the next election. Because it is a multi-member district, there is going to be more than one MPP in your district. When one MPP goes back to the district to discuss issues in the local papers, or in public forums, the other MPPs will have to scurry back to the district to get their faces in front of the voters. They are going to be discussing local issues. What they learn, they will take back to Queen’s Park.
- Sometime, they will be cooperating on issues that are important to everyone in the district, sometimes not. But there will be a discussion about local issues. With SMDs, there is no discussion during the term of office because there is only one local MPP. With MMP, the regional MPPs will be spending time where it counts, with the party powerbrokers.
- MPPs are going to be in your neighbourhood, discussing issues, because they will be running their campaigns for the four years in between elections; not just in the 28 days before the election.

Getting things done with your MPP

- A good thing for voters is that, if they have a particular issue that needs to be addressed, there will usually be an MPP from the government and MPPs from opposition parties that they can go to, so they can make their case to both sets of MPPs. They will almost always be able to find an MPP who has a sympathetic ear, to address their concerns.

The STV counting system tries its best to make sure your highest preferences get elected. It doesn't just look at your ballot, throw it in a pile and then forget about you

- Almost all voters in Ontario would get representation in Queen's Park.
- After stacking all the ballots up with the first preferences, the counting system picks up your ballot and ask how you would like to proceed.
- If your candidate has received twice the votes she needs, the counting system asks if you would like to use your whole vote on your first candidate, or only the amount of your vote needed, freeing up a portion of your vote to help elect a subsequent preference. In this way, your vote is not wasted and you don't have to vote strategically.
- If your first choice doesn't stand a chance of winning, the counting system will ask who your next preference is, and your vote will be transferred to that candidate.
- The counting process continues until all the seats are filled and the most preferred candidates in the district are elected.
- Because STV electoral districts have multiple-members, even if your ballot gets stuck on a candidate who can't get elected, it's reasonable to assume that you will have an MPP available to represent you from a party that reflects your point of view, and that you can support.
- The STV counting system is more involved than that of FPTP's and MMP's. However, the added care and attention given to your ballot is worth the extra algebra that a computer handles so easily. Like your car, you don't have to know exactly how it works to drive it 100 kph down the highway.

Strategic Voting – Not needed

- One great thing about STV is that the best strategy for a voter, is to vote honestly, to vote your preferences honestly, because strategic voting doesn't work in STV. There is no strategic voting except to vote for your first preference first, your second preference next and not actually voting for someone who you don't want to get elected. Strategic voting is difficult and prone to errors because it is often impossible to know who to vote for.

There will be more female candidates and a greater diversity of candidates

- Political parties can't do the same thing that happens in single-member districts right now, where they put up the most likely person they think will win; who too

often happens to look like a middle aged white guy. They're going to have to put up more people from diverse backgrounds and more women, or they will lose votes.

- STV reduces systematic discrimination against women and others.
- These candidates will have a real opportunity to win. They won't be stuck in ridings in which they don't stand a chance of winning. They'll be in a situation in which they actually can get elected.

STV doesn't discriminate like FPTP & MMP against women and others who want to become constituency or government MPPs

- Because MMP systems retain the single-member constituency districts, they also retain the discrimination that SMDs create. Most government members come from MMP constituency seats. See page 5. This combination hurts women. The women MMP adds will likely end up in opposition.
- In STV's multi-member districts, the major parties will have the greatest opportunity to provide diversity in each district. They will also be the most likely to form government. This helps women to get into government and Cabinet.
- Under STV, all MPPs are the same type. All STV MPPs represent essentially the same number of voters. All STV MPPs are elected using the same electoral system. All STV MPPs are equal.

STV creates the possibility of different kinds of constituencies

- Right now, constituencies are just geographic. With STV, there can be different types of constituencies. They might relate to the environment, the arts, health care, cultural relations, social or business issues. If women's representation is important to a voter, they can select all women, from different parties.
- Instead of portraying yourself as a one dimensional, right-wing or left-wing person to the voting system, voters can portray themselves in a multi-dimensional way. For instance, a person might portray himself, or herself, as fiscally conservative first. A person might then say that they are an environmentalist second, socially progressive third, and a health care advocate fourth. These preferences can either be with one party, or across party lines. This multi-dimensional sketch of who you are will be put on your ballot and then counted. The counting system will take this into account when it looks at your ballot.
- This preference selection mechanism can help to shape parties' policies and direction. If environmentalists are preferred by the voters, the parties and the candidates will learn this and adjust their policies and candidates accordingly.

“Next Preference Votes” are important and will be sought out by most candidates

- This means that there will be a tendency to avoid attack ads and confrontational election campaigns which will turn off voters whose second preferences a candidate needs. Candidates will have to rely on issues more than smear tactics.

- Extremist candidates, who cannot gain second preferences, will find it more difficult to get elected.

Members from the same party will be competing against each other during elections and during their terms of office

THIS IS A GOOD THING

- With multi-member districts, parties will put up several candidates in the same district, typically one more than they think they'll win. So, there may be four candidates from the same party running against each other, probably to get three seats. And this brings up some interesting possibilities, all fuelled by competition to get support from the electorate, both during elections and throughout their terms of office.
- Instead of just having to curry favour with the political party powerbrokers to get their party's nomination, MPPs will have to pay attention to the voters, because it will be the voter that makes the final selection.

With STV's multi-member districts and preferential voting, every voter has a direct say in the candidate selection process of the political parties

- If the party puts up four candidates, and one is not desirable, the voter gets to choose which of those three will get elected, because they vote for the worse choice last, or not at all. So, if you have an incumbent MPP who is not doing a good job, that incumbent MPP can be dropped off of the list. This means that there are no safe seats for candidates. There may be safe seats for parties, but not safe seats for candidates. This results in increased accountability.
- Over time, voters, and not just the political party leadership, will help shape the nature of each party and its policies, by determining who's in the elected party's hierarchy.
- By helping to select the parties' candidates, the voter will have more control of political parties' policies. When powerful incumbents lose touch with the voters, they will be removed by the voters, which will provide a useful service to the political parties.
- With STV, a voter truly gets to vote for both the person and the party they support.
- Currently, in safe districts for a political party, the real decision about who will be your MPP happens in the political party's candidate selection process. Your vote on Election Day is often irrelevant. With STV, there are no safe seats for candidates. Elections in every district are meaningful.
- STV helps political parties to rejuvenate and remain relevant when voters don't support powerful but ineffective and counter productive candidates.

Accountability improves under STV

- You will be able to support your party of choice, but you will also be able to vote against a candidate from that party who has not been doing a good job. So,

accountability of individual MPPs will increase. You can also vote against your party of choice, or party that is an incumbent governing party, if they haven't been doing a good job.

“Kicking the bums out” accountability not needed as much

- The important thing to understand about policy swings and the inevitable “kicking the bums out” accountability process, is that by having absolute power during their term in office, FPTP governments are free to go down the wrong roads, without constraint. Eventually they screw up so much, offend so many people, that they are kicked out of office at the next election.
- Wouldn't it be better for there to be the checks of a coalition government to keep it out of trouble in the first place and save the public having to endure often very harmful and disruptive policies?

Majority, Minority & Coalition Governments

- With STV, you can elect minority, majority and coalition governments, depending on how the voters cast their ballots.
- The United Nations Human Development Index (see page 16) clearly shows that proportional governments perform very well for their jurisdictions.

Coalition governments provide stable government policy

- Usually, STV (& MMP) will be electing coalition governments. That's when two or more parties come together and through dialogue and discussion, either before or after an election, make an agreement to govern the province giving the coalition a majority of seats in the legislature.
- Coalitions have enough power in the legislature to carry on a program of policy development and governing, in much the same way that majority governments do right now, but with greater consent of the people.
- Coalition governments tend to result in more consensual decision making. This is seen throughout the world wherever there are proportional governments.

Policy swings will be less extreme, providing more stable government policy

- Coalition governments in Ontario would reduce the number and degree of wild swings from the right to the left, and back again, with policy being undone, made over and changed back again. When labour policy is changed, manufacturing policy is changed, and environment policy is radically changed, that creates not a stable governing situation, but an unstable governing situation. It creates a province where investors don't know what to expect. It makes it very difficult for citizens who are directly affected by government policy.
- Coalition governments tend to have more moderate policy, more middle of the road, more consensus based policy, addressing all the concerns, or most of the concerns of a greater number of people in the province, so the policy swings, when governments change, will tend to be more gradual. There won't be wild swings from one side to the other.

More stable investment climate

- With reduced policy swings, home grown and external investors will have less risk and will be more willing to invest in Ontario. Unpredictable changes of business, labour, resource, and manufacturing regulations scare away investment.
- When a government uses incentives to attract investment and then those programs are discontinued by the next government, jobs leave the province.

Absolute power corrupts absolutely

- With coalition governments, there will likely be less power in the Premier's office and more power in the hands of the MPPs, and therefore, more power in the hands of the voter.
- Because the Premier will have to reach across party lines for support, and there will be more than one party represented in Cabinet, it will be less likely that ill considered ideas that pop into the Premier's head will actually see the light of day.
- There will be someone else in the room to add balance to the decision making process.
- Through coalition governments and increased MPP accountability, STV will tend to reduce the power of the Premier's office and the political parties in determining what government and party policy will be.
- This power to influence policy will tend to devolve to the MPPs and to the Legislature, where increased levels of discussion and deliberation can lead to better policy development.

No more “Follow the Leader” politicians

- There will be at least two party leaders who will have to discuss and agree on policy. There will be a much better environment for discussion and deliberative policy making, much better than just following the Premier's unconsidered whim.

Parties will retain strength to provide structure to political system

- Political parties will still remain strong, continuing to provide a useful structure to our political system and culture. They will be more in touch with the voters.
- Political parties will lose some power, especially around the final candidate selection process, but even this will allow the parties to clear out the dead wood, with help from the voters. This will actually help the parties.
- If a party is to remain dynamic and relevant, and in power, it will need to change with the times. Unfortunately, it may be difficult, within a party, to get rid of powerful people who are holding the party back. The voters can help the parties in this rejuvenation processes.
- More dynamic political parties will lead to a nimbler policy development process which is important in a rapidly changing world.

MPPs will have more power

- MPPs will be under increased pressure by the electorate to perform for them. All MPPs will have to be more forceful within their party. As a result, party policy will be modified to more reflect voter's values and desires, rather than the thoughts of a few back room party officials or their party leaders.

Voters will have more power

- When MPPs have more power, voters have more power.

STV is simple to use

- STV is different and it is new to us. But we learn about new things all the time. Microsoft is bringing out a new operating system. We will all learn how to use it. Most of us have figured out how to use cell phones. We don't have to know exactly how a compressor works to use a fridge. I have no idea what's under the hood of my car, but I drive it at 120 kph down the highway.
- People who want to keep our current system or who prefer a system which keeps power in the hands of the political parties (MMP) often characterize STV as too complicated. These are usually clever people who are being disingenuous. They are using fear to accomplish political goals.
- If people in Ireland, Malta and Australia can understand and use STV, people in Ontario certainly can.
- Preference voting is simpler to use than plurality voting because you don't have to figure out how to be effectively strategic.

STV is a much simpler system to understand than MMP

- Neither STV nor MMP are too complicated to understand. However, if you think MMP is straight forward, take a look at the Ontario Citizens' Assembly Submission # 1249. MMP is definitely not simple.
- If you think FPTP is straight forward, try to explain how a party that doesn't get the most votes can form a majority government and why that's acceptable.

STV will increase voter turn out

- Without the need and difficulty of voting strategically, voters will better know who they want to vote for. Preference voting accurately reflects how we normally think about things. This is my favourite, that is my next choice, and that is last. We do it all the time. It makes more sense to us than plurality voting.
- When you know your vote won't be wasted and that you will actually elect someone, you will be more likely to turn up and vote.
- Democracy is served when more of us vote and when we all get the representative we voted for.

**STV is free of Single-Member Districts.
And that's a very good thing.**

Statistics: Human Development Index, % Women & Proportional Systems

HDI Rank	Country	Lower House		Upper House		Proportional System?
		System	Women	System	Women	
1	Norway	List PR	37.9%	None		Yes
2	Iceland	List PR	33.3	None	-	Yes
3	Australia	AV	24.7	STV	35.5	Yes (Upper)
4	Ireland	STV	13.3	Appoint.	16.7	Yes
5	Sweden	List PR	47.3%	None		Yes
6	Canada	FPTP	20.8%	Appoint.	35.0%	-
7	Japan	MMM	9.4%	MMM	14.5%	-
8	United States	FPTP	16.2%	FPTP	16.0%	-
9	Switzerland	MMM	25.0%		23.9%	-
10	Netherlands	List PR	36.7%		29.3%	Yes
11	Finland	List PR	38%	None		Yes
12	Luxembourg	List PR	23.3%	None	-	Yes
13	Belgium	List PR	34.7%		38.0%	Yes
14	Austria	List PR	32.2%	Appoint.	27.4%	Yes
15	Denmark	List PR	36.9%	None		Yes
16	France	2 Round	12.2	MMM	16.9	-
17	Italy	MMP	17.3%	MMP	13.7%	Yes
18	United Kingdom	FPTP	19.7%	Appoint.	18.9%	-
19	Spain	List PR	36.0%		23.2	Yes
20	New Zealand	MMP	32.2%	None	-	Yes
21	Germany	MMP	31.6%	Appoint.	21.7	Yes
22	Hong Kong SAR, China	?	?	?	?	?
23	Israel	List PR	14.2%		-	Yes
24	Greece	List PR	13.0%		-	Yes
25	Singapore	Block	21.2	-	-	-
32	Malta	STV	9.2	-	-	Yes
35	Hungary	MMP	10.4	-	-	Yes
53	Mexico	MMP	22.6	-	-	Yes
72	Venezuela	MMP	18.0			Yes
73	Albania	MMP	7.1	-	-	Yes
115	Bolivia	MMP	16.9	?	3.7	Yes
149	Lesotho	MMP	11.7	Appoint.	36.4	Yes

Percent Women: From "Women in National Parliaments", www.ipu.org 30 Nov 2006

United Nations Human Development Index

From Wikipedia

"The Human Development Index (HDI) is a comparative measure of life expectancy, literacy, education, and standards of living for countries worldwide. It is a standard means of measuring well-being, especially child welfare. It is used to distinguish whether the country is a developed, a developing, or an under-developed country, and also to measure the impact of economic policies on quality of life."

The **Gender Empowerment Measure** (GEM) is linked to the UN Human Development Index. The GEM is a composite indicator that captures gender inequality in three key areas:

- The extent of women's political participation and decision-making.
- Economic participation and decision making-power.
- The power exerted by women over economic resources.

Canada ranks 11th out of 75 countries in the GEM, with a value of 0.810. This indicates that opportunities for women in Canada are lower than should be expected from the 6th ranked country on the UN HDI. In other words; women's representation in government is a weak area for Canada and if we improve this, our UN HDI ranking should go up. This is an obvious area for improvement.

Proportional Systems and the UN Human Development Index

16 of the top 25 UN HDI countries have proportional electoral systems. So, proportional electoral systems don't seem to be a barrier for a country to do well on a broad range of indicators. It is interesting to see Ireland, with STV, ranked 4th and Australia, with an STV Senate ranked 3rd.

Woman's Representation

Jurisdictions that use STV and MMP are listed in the table.

- **MMP** performs well in **New Zealand** with 32.2% and poorly in **Albania** with 7.1%.
- **STV** performs well in the **Australian Senate** with 35.5% and poorly in **Malta** with 9.2%.

The statistics show that depending on the jurisdiction, both MMP & STV can perform reasonably well, or very poorly. Australia is interesting because with an identical culture for both Houses, the single member district Lower House (under AV) has 24.7% women and the multi-member district Senate (under STV) has 35.5% women.

The Fundamental Flaw of MMP

MMP takes on all of the flaws of Single-Member Districts (SMD) and tries to cure them with a second tier of Multi-Member District MPPs.

SMD problems are so diverse and wide spread that no amount of "cure" can fix them.

Mixed-member systems (both MMP & MMM) are a little bit like trying to cope with a "Boil Water Advisory" (like we had in Vancouver and you had in Walkerton) by diluting your tap water, 60 / 40 with bottled water.

It's a silly idea for water and it doesn't work for electoral systems.

MMP retains the discrimination against women (& others) and the high levels of False Representation from the Single-Member Districts of our current system. No amount of watering down can cure these SMD flaws.